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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4259

DIANA RIVERA O’BRYANT,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF READING; JOSEPH EPPIHIMER; JEFFREY WHITE; NAN BALMER;
JESUS PENA; ERIC GALOSI; TAMMY KIPP,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-06635)
District Judge: The Honorable James K. Gardner

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 8, 2006
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 20, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Diana Rivera O’Bryant filed two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her
employer, the City of Reading, Pennsylvania (the “City”), alleging that she was deprived
of her right to equal protection under the law and that she was subject to retaliation
because she exercised her First Amendment right of free speech. Pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), O’Bryant also alleged that the City was obligated to
compensate her with overtime pay for the hours she worked in excess of forty hours per
week. After the close of discovery, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on all claims. Because O’Bryant argued only the FLSA claim in her
opening brief on appeal, she has waived this Court’s review of her other claims. As to
her claim under the FLSA, the District Court concluded that O’Bryant was an
administrative employee exempt from the FLSA and therefore not required to be
compensated with overtime pay. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.
I. Background
O’Bryant was hired in September 1998 by the City as a part-time Fair Housing
Intake Specialist at a position that paid $14.00 per hour. In that capacity, she performed
intake functions related to complaints of alleged housing discrimination. In December
1998, O’Bryant’s position was expanded to full-time, and as of January 1, 1999, she was
no longer paid by the hour, earning instead a salary of $26,244 per year.
In December 2001, the City offered O’Bryant the position of Human Relations
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Commission Administrator. In the offer letter to O’Bryant, the City indicated that this
was a management position. The job description stated that the Human Relations
Commission Administrator was responsible for “administration, management and intake
functions related to the implementation and enforcement of the City’s Human Relations
Ordinance.” O’Bryant’s salary was increased to $32,000 per year, and her duties
performed in this position included preparing an annual budget for the Commission,
preparing grant applications and reports, approving purchases and bill payments,
maintaining Commission case files, and providing intake services to individuals interested
in filing a complaint of discrimination with the Commission. In this position, O’Bryant
also produced and hosted a local television show, developed and created informational
materials to disseminate to the public, supervised other Commission staff, screened all
housing discrimination complaints, interviewed complainants, determined whether a
complaint should be filed, and initiated and filed these complaints. In 2003, O’Bryant’s
salary as the Human Relations Commission Administrator rose to $32,960 per year.
O’Byrant asserts that, when the evidence is viewed in her favor as the nonmoving
party, the District Court’s conclusion that she was an exempt administrative employee
from the FLSA is insufficiently supported by the facts. She notes that, as an affirmative
defense, the City’s assertion of exemption must be found by the court to be so clear “that
no rational jury could find to the contrary.” EEOC v. Del. Dep’t of Health and Soc.
Servs., 865 F2d 1408, 1414 (3d Cir. 1989). O’Bryant argues that the City failed to meet
this standard. She avers that the District Court did not correctly weigh her sworn
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statements in granting summary judgment, but rather viewed them as mere contentions.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary and we
therefore apply the same standard as the District Court. Orsatti v. New Jersey State
Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). In order to affirm, we must find that there is no
genuine issue of material fact when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id.1
II. Discussion
It is well settled that the failure by an appellant to raise or argue issues in his
opening brief constitutes a waiver of those issues on appeal. U.S. v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). The only claim O’Bryant raised in her opening brief was her
FLSA overtime compensation claim. Therefore, even to the extent that O’Bryant tried to
redress these issues in her reply brief, her failure to sufficiently identify them in her
opening brief constitutes a waiver of those issues. See U.S. Vazquez, 271F.3d 93, 107
(3d Cir. 2001).
As to the one remaining issue, the FLSA claim, 29 U.S.C. § 201 provides that
employers are required to pay overtime compensation to employees who work in excess
of forty hours per workweek. However, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) states that any person
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity is exempt
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. As
this is an appeal from a final decision of the District Court, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
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from this mandatory overtime compensation provision.
To be categorized as an administrative employee for this purpose, the work of the
employee must satisfy the criteria set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. First, the employee
must be compensated on a salary basis. Second, the primary duties conducted by the
employee must qualify as “administrative” and the employee must exercise independent
judgment and discretion in the performance of her duties. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.
It is undisputed by the parties that O’Bryant satisfies the salary basis test. She was
paid a predetermined amount without regard to the number of days or hours worked. See
29 C.F.R. § 541.602. As to the administrative nature of the employee’s primary duties,
the employee’s activities must be directly related to assisting with the operation of the
business of the employer, as distinguished from, for example, working on a
manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment. 29
C.F.R. § 541.201. An employee’s primary duty is defined as work that involves over
50% of the employees work time. Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F. 3d 685, 699 (3d
Cir. 1994). However, this standard is flexible, depending on the importance of the
administrative duties conducted, the frequency of use of discretionary power, the freedom
from supervision, and comparative wages. See e.g. Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, 722
F.2d 1141, 1144 (3d Cir. 1983) (concluding “a sufficient presence of pertinent factors”
was enough to find managerial duties as the employee’s primary duties even though they
were performed less than 50% of the work time); Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler
Plymouth, 203 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2000) (“As a general rule, an employee’s “primary
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duty” involves over 50% of the employee’s work time. And yet, flexibility is appropriate
when applying this rule.”)
O’Bryant contends that because she stated in her Declaration that her duties
consisted primarily of implementing the City’s Human Relations Ordinance and HUD
programs, as well as providing intake services--all of which she conducted without
deviating from the provisions of the City’s Ordinance or the HUD programs--her work
cannot be considered directly related to the management or general business of the City.
We disagree.
The record demonstrates that O’Bryant’s primary duties were administrative in
relation to the City due to the significant functions that she and the Commission played in
its general operation. The enforcement, administration and management of actions
surrounding the Human Relations Ordinance were directly and integrally related to the
general management and operation of the City as a whole. Furthermore, 29 C.F.R. §
541.201(a) provides that administrative employment includes “work in functional areas
such as. . .accounting, budgeting. . .personnel management, human resources. . .public
relations, government relations. . .legal and regulatory compliance and, and similar
activities.” O’Bryant’s position as Human Relations Commission Administrator entailed
similar activities as primary duties, and she herself has sworn to performing such
functions in her deposition.
In addition to O’Bryant’s work being considered administrative in nature, in order
for the defendants to prevail, there must also be no disputed material facts relating to
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whether she exercised discretion and independent judgment in the course of her
employment. Employment that involves ‘discretion and independent judgment’ can be
described by such factors as,
whether the employee carries out major assignments in conducting the
operations of the business; whether the employee performs work that affects
business operations to a substantial degree, even if the employee’s assignments
are related to operation of a particular segment of the business. . .and whether
the employee represents the company in handling complaints, arbitrating
disputes or resolving grievances.

29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b). The exercise of discretion and independent judgment does not
require that the decision have finality and complete absence of review. 29 C.F.R.§
541.202(c). It could take the form of a recommendation or a decision that was revised at
a higher level and still for this purpose, be considered an independent decision made
within her discretion. Id.
O’Bryant stated at her deposition that educational programs are a major component
of the position of Human Relations Commission Administrator. As a part of this element
of her job, she produced and hosted a TV show and created brochures and other
informational materials in which she decided what issues were of the most relevance.
Additionally, she stated that she assessed and reviewed all the complaints that came into
the Commission and decided who should be interviewed regarding these complaints.
These actions are clear examples of the exercise of independent judgment and discretion
in the course of her employment duties.
Nevertheless, O’Bryant states in a post-deposition Declaration that she spent over
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40% of her time typing, filing or performing intake services and that she did little but
implement the City’s present housing policies in the course of her employment. She
contends that the statements made in this Declaration oppose a finding that she exercised
discretion and independent judgment and therefore the District Court improperly granted
summary judgment. Again, we disagree.
It is well established that a party may not create a material issue of fact to defeat
summary judgment by filing an affidavit disputing her previously own sworn testimony
without demonstrating a plausible explanation for the conflict. Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d
609 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, any discrepancies between O’Bryant’s deposition and her
later Declaration cannot be viewed as an impediment to summary judgment unless they
can plausibly be explained away, which O’Bryant failed to do.
Taking the statements made in her deposition into account, the record establishes
that, notwithstanding the time O’Bryant might have spent on clerical activities, her
primary duties were directly related, and significant, to the general business and operation
of the City. These duties often required the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment. Therefore, we find that O’Bryant satisfies the criteria of 29 CFR § 541.200 and
we conclude that she is an administrative employee exempt from the FLSA. Accordingly,
we affirm the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion of summary judgment on
this issue.
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